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Objective: To estimate the impact of the major components of the ACA (Medicaid
expansion, subsidized Marketplace plans, and insurance market reforms) on disparities in insurance coverage after three years.
Data Source: The 2011-2016 waves of the American Community Survey (ACS), with
the sample restricted to nonelderly adults.
Design: We estimate a difference-in-difference-in-differences model to separately
identify the effects of the nationwide and Medicaid expansion portions of the ACA
using the methodology developed in the recent ACA literature. The differences come
from time, state Medicaid expansion status, and local area pre-ACA uninsured rates.
In order to focus on access disparities, we stratify our sample separately by income,
race/ethnicity, marital status, age, gender, and geography.
Principal Findings: After three years, the fully implemented ACA eliminated 43% of
the coverage gap across income groups, with the Medicaid expansion accounting for
this entire reduction. The ACA also reduced coverage disparities across racial groups
by 23%, across marital status by 46%, and across age-groups by 36%, with these
changes being partly attributable to both the Medicaid expansion and nationwide
components of the law.
Conclusions: The fully implemented ACA has been successful in reducing coverage
disparities across multiple groups.
KEYWORDS

gender/sex differences in health and health care, health care financing/insurance/premiums,
health policy/politics/law/regulation, medicaid, racial/ethnic differences in health and health
care, state health policies

1 | I NTRO D U C TI O N

components of the ACA, including the individual mandate, subsidized Marketplace coverage, and state Medicaid expansions, were

Prior to the implementation of the primary components of the

designed to reduce health insurance coverage disparities by moving

Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014, there were well-documented

the U.S. closer to universal coverage.3 The purpose of this paper was

disparities in insurance coverage along multiple dimensions, such as

to examine the extent to which the ACA reduced disparities in cov-

age, race, income, family structure, and geography.1,2 The primary

erage after three years (2014-2016).

[The copyright line in this article was changed on 10 January 2019 after online publication.]
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2018 The Authors. Health Services Research published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Health Research and Educational Trust
Health Serv Res. 2019;54:307–316.

wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/hesr

|

307

308

|

COURTEMANCHE et al.

Health Services Research

While gains in insurance coverage after the ACA have been

income, race/ethnicity, marital status, age, gender, and geogra-

well documented, few papers in this literature examine how the

phy. Data come from the American Community Survey (ACS) be-

ACA affected coverage disparities. One recent paper estimates

tween 2011 and 2016. The ACS includes multiple categories of

the first-year impact of the ACA on coverage using difference-in-

insurance coverage, allowing us to evaluate how the ACA affected

difference-
in-
differences (DDD) models where the differences

coverage disparities via changes to both private and public cov-

come from time, state Medicaid expansion decisions, and pre-ACA

erage. In addition, the ACS is a large enough survey to precisely

local area uninsured rates.4 This strategy leverages the propensity

estimate the effects for states and many local areas, given that it

for universal coverage initiatives to provide the most intense “treat-

includes approximately 3 000 000 observations per year and rel-

ment” in local areas with the highest prereform uninsured rates.5,6

atively narrow geographic identifiers. Finally, the mandatory na-

Using data from the American Community Survey (ACS), the authors

ture of the ACS reduces concerns about sample selection among

find that the ACA increased coverage by an average of 5.9 percent-

respondents.

age points in Medicaid expansion states compared to 2.8 percentage

Our primary hypothesis is that, in its first three years, the ACA sig-

points in nonexpansion states in 2014.4 In subsample analyses, they

nificantly reduced insurance coverage disparities across demographic

show that the fully implemented ACA (including the Medicaid ex-

groups. We contribute to the literature on the ACA’s coverage effects

pansion) reduced the coverage disparity between college graduates

in multiple ways. First, we are, to our knowledge, the first to quan-

and those with a high school diploma or less by 11.4%, and that be-

tify the impacts of the ACA on disparities using three years of post-

tween whites and nonwhites by 14%.4 The paper also finds greater

ACA implementation data (2014-2016). One recent study examines

gains in coverage for young adults and unmarried individuals, which

the effect on the uninsured rate after three years using the BRFSS,

had lower pre-ACA coverage rates than older adults and married in-

but does not specifically examine disparities.14 Second, in contrast

dividuals, respectively.

4

to the BRFSS, the ACS allows us to examine how changes in sources

Another recent paper uses the same research strategy and data

of coverage, such as employer-sponsored and individually purchased

from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS), finding

private coverage and Medicaid, drove any changes in disparities.

that the ACA reduced the coverage disparity between those with

Third, in contrast to other recent work,9,10 our approach allows us to

7

incomes above versus below the median by 38%. A third paper uses

estimate the impact of the fully implemented ACA, rather than just

ACS data through 2015 and leverages variation in state Medicaid

focusing on the Medicaid expansion. Fourth, we examine disparities

expansion decisions, pre-ACA eligibility requirements, and subsidy

along a new dimension: residence in rural vs. urban locations.

rates across the income distribution.8 They find that coverage gains
from the Medicaid expansion and premium subsidies are larger
among childless adult couples than among single adults or adults

2 | DATA

with children, but the increase from the individual mandate is largest
among singles.8

The ACS is a nationally representative survey administered by the

Other studies focus only on the ACA’s Medicaid expansion, using

Census Bureau sampling approximately 1% of the U.S. population an-

simpler difference-in-differences (DD) models to compare changes

nually. Participation is mandatory, and the survey can be completed

in insurance coverage over time between Medicaid expansion and

online or through the mail. In terms of geography, the ACS identifies

nonexpansion states. One paper includes 2015 data from the ACS

all 50 states and the District of Columbia, and additionally identifies

and shows that the Medicaid expansion reduced the coverage dis-

localities known as Public Use Microdata Areas (PUMAs). PUMAs are

parity between 19-to 26-and 56-to 64-year-olds by 15%, while

approximately 2300 areas of at least 100 000 people nested entirely

the disparity between Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites only fell

within a state. Our primary sample consists of 19-to 64-year-olds

by 4%.9 Another paper, also using data through 2015, finds that

from calendar years 2011 to 2016, which results in over 3 000 000

the Medicaid expansion led to smaller gains among low-
income

individuals per year. By starting our sample period in 2011, we aim,

Hispanics than other low-income individuals, implying a widened

as in other recent work,4 to measure only the effects of the package

disparity.10 Other papers provide evidence that the Medicaid expan-

of ACA provisions taking effect in 2014, as opposed to also capturing

sion increased insurance coverage among those with low incomes or

the effect of the 2010 dependent coverage mandate that required

levels of education, implying reduced disparities relative to individ-

insurers to allow dependents to remain on their parents’ insurance

uals with higher socioeconomic status.11,12 One study’s focus is on

plans until the plan year following their 26th birthday. This mandate

the impact of the ACA in a single state, Kentucky, finding that much

has already been studied extensively in prior research.15-19

of the reduction in the state’s uninsured rate is due to large coverage
gains from areas with higher concentrations of poverty.13
We contribute to this literature by using the DDD method described above and elsewhere

4,7,14

We create several binary outcome variables based on the ACS
insurance coverage questions: any insurance, any private insurance (either employer sponsored or directly purchased), employer-

to uncover the causal impact

sponsored insurance, directly purchased insurance, Medicaid, and

of the 2014 ACA provisions, both with and without the Medicaid

any other coverage. We define other coverage as neither private nor

expansion, on coverage disparities after three years. Changes in

Medicaid coverage. These categories are not mutually exclusive due

coverage disparities are evaluated by stratifying our sample by

to the possibility of multiple sources of coverage.
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rates in 2013 to identify the impact of the national components
of the ACA, we would ideally simply use the PUMA classification
system included in the ACS. Unfortunately, the PUMA definitions

0.090 (0.286)

duced in the 2010 Census. To address this problem, we follow a

0.038 (0.191)

0.100 (0.299)

0.649 (0.477)

0.722 (0.448)

changed during our sample period due to new boundaries intro0.837 (0.370)

Nonexpansion; below median
baseline uninsured

In order to exploit within-state variation in pre-ACA uninsured

recent paper4 and use both the old and new PUMA classification
systems to identify core-based statistical areas (CBSAs), which we
then use as our local areas. If a CBSA spans multiple states, we define a different local area for the parts of the CBSA in each state. In
of each state, in order to prevent respondents who do not live in a
CBSA from being dropped from the sample. We classify non-CBSA
local areas as “rural” and CBSA local areas as “urban.” Our dataset
78 781 ACS respondents in 2013, with a median of 1020 and a mean

0.041 (0.198)

0.090 (0.286)

0.091 (0.287)

0.543 (0.498)

0.610 (0.488)

consists of 630 local areas that each contain between 356 and
0.729 (0.444)

Nonexpansion; at or above
median baseline uninsured

addition, we create additional local areas for the non-CBSA portion

of 2811 respondents. This implies that our pre-ACA uninsured rates
are computed from a reasonably large sample in each local area.
By 2016, a total of 32 states expanded their Medicaid program
via the ACA. 20 The majority of these states, 25 in all, expanded
(August) expanded later in 2014. Pennsylvania (January), Indiana
(February), and Alaska (September) expanded Medicaid during 2015.
Finally, Montana (January) and Louisiana (July) expanded Medicaid

0.121 (0.326)

0.024 (0.152)

0.094 (0.292)

0.650 (0.477)

0.719 (0.450)

during 2016. We assign the starting date of these states’ Medicaid
0.847 (0.359)

Medicaid expansion; below
median baseline uninsured

Medicaid in January 2014. Michigan (April) and New Hampshire

expansions in our expansion indicator accordingly.
Our “demographic” controls include dummies for age (25-29, 30-
34, 35-39, 40-4 4, 45-49, 50-54, 55-59, and 60-6 4, with 19-24 being
the omitted base category), female, race/ethnicity (non-
Hispanic
black, Hispanic, and other race/ethnicity, with non-Hispanic white

the number of children 18 and under in the household (one, two,
three, four, and five or more, with zero being the omitted category).
Our “economic” controls consist of dummies for education (high
0.115 (0.319)

0.030 (0.169)

0.093 (0.291)

0.544 (0.498)

0.616 (0.486)

school degree, some college, and college graduate, with less than
0.748 (0.434)

Medicaid expansion; at or above
median baseline uninsured

tus. Our “family structure” controls include dummies for married and

a high school degree as the omitted category), household income
(dummies for each 10-point increment of income as a percentage of
the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), with the highest category including
everyone over 500%), whether the respondent reports her primary
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.

0.032 (0.176)

0.106 (0.307)
Medicaid

Other

0.094 (0.292)

0.598 (0.490)
Employer-sponsored

Individually purchased

0.668 (0.471)
Any private

0.792 (0.406)

Full sample

occupation as student, and whether the respondent is unemployed,

Any insurance
coverage

TA B L E 1

Descriptive statistics for insurance coverage

being the omitted category), foreign-born, and U.S. citizenship sta-

as well as one continuous variable: the Bureau of Labor Statistics’
annual state unemployment rate. Finally, we include interactions
of the post-
treatment dummy with indicators of whether states
set up their own private insurance exchanges (as opposed to using
the federal exchange) and whether these exchanges experienced
glitches. 20,21 These variables serve as proxies for harder-to-measure
aspects of state involvement with the ACA, such as the degree of
state outreach.
Table 1 provides pretreatment means and standard deviations of
the dependent variables of interest measuring insurance coverage,
while Table S1 does the same for the controls. We also stratify into four
groups based on whether the respondent’s state expanded Medicaid

|

COURTEMANCHE et al.

Health Services Research
Any Insurance Coverage

Any Private Coverage

Employer Sponsored Coverage

2013

year

2014

2015

2016

2012

.13

year

2014

2015

2016

2011

2012

2013

year

2014

2015

2016

2015

2016

Other Coverage

.02

.09

.1

.1

.025

.15

.11

.03

.2

.12

2013

Medicaid Coverage

.25

Individually Purchased Coverage

2011

.04

2012

.035

2011

.5

.7

.6

.75

.65

.55

.8

.7

.85

.6

.75

.9

.65

.8

.95
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2011

2012

2013

year

2014

2015

2016

2011

2012

2013

year

2014

2015

2016

2011

2012

2013

year

2014

Above Median Local Area Uninsured Rate and Expanded Medicaid
Below Median Local Area Uninsured Rate and Expanded Medicaid
Above Median Local Area Uninsured Rate and No Expansion
Below Median Local Area Uninsured Rate and No Expansion
FIGURE 1

Changes in insurance coverage over time

and whether her local area’s pretreatment uninsured rate was above or

rates.4,7,14 Our baseline DDD regression equation is given by equa-

below the median for individuals in the sample. Table 1 shows that 79%

tion (1) below. In order to examine coverage disparities, we estimate

of the sample was covered by some type of insurance in the baseline year

this model separately for different subsamples, such as separately

of 2013, including 11% with Medicaid and 60% with employer-provided

for males and females.

coverage. For both the high-and low-uninsured rate subgroups, individ-

yiast =𝛾0 + 𝛾1 (UNINSUREDas × POSTt ) + 𝛾2 (MEDICAIDS × POSTt )+

uals in Medicaid expansion states were slightly more likely to be covered by some type of insurance in 2013 than those in nonexpansion

𝛾3 (UNINSUREDas × MEDICAIDS × POSTt ) + 𝛾4 Xiast + 𝜃t + 𝛼as + 𝜀iast (1)

states, with the differences being driven entirely by Medicaid coverage.

where yiast is an indicator of insurance coverage for individual i in

Our DDD model will account for such baseline differences.

local area a in state s in year t, POSTt is an indicator for whether

Figure 1 presents changes in our coverage measures between

period t is in the postreform period of 2014 or later, X iast is a vec-

2011 and 2016, stratified into the same four groups. With six in-

tor of control variables previously described, MEDICAID s is an

surance outcomes and four groups per outcome, there are a total

indicator for whether state s participated in the ACA’s Medicaid

of 24 lines. In general, the pre-ACA trends do not appear to differ

expansion, UNINSURED as is the 2013 (pre-ACA) uninsured rate

meaningfully by state Medicaid expansion status or local area pre-

in local area a within state s, 𝜃t denotes year fixed effects, 𝛼as de-

ACA uninsured rate. This provides preliminary support for the use

notes local area fixed effects, and 𝜀iast is a standard error term.

of the pre-ACA uninsured rate and Medicaid expansion variables as

The term POSTt is not separately included in Equation (1)

sources of identification in our DDD model. Figure 1 shows that the

since it is absorbed by the time fixed effects, while the terms

probabilities of having any coverage, privately purchased coverage,

UNINSUREDas × MEDICAIDst are not separately included since they

any private coverage, and Medicaid increased in 2014 and continued

are absorbed by the local area fixed effects.

to grow over the following two years.

The effect of the ACA without the Medicaid expansion is
given by γ 1 × UNINSURED as , which means it is assumed to be

3 | M E TH O DS

zero in a (hypothetical) area with a 0% uninsured rate at baseline and to increase linearly as the pre-ACA uninsured rate rises. 4
Similarly, the effect of the Medicaid expansion alone is given by

In order to uncover the causal impact of the ACA on coverage dis-

𝛾3 × UNINSUREDas × MEDICAIDst, meaning it is zero in nonexpansion

parities after three years, we follow the recent ACA literature by es-

states (where MEDICAIDst = 0) and 𝛾3 × UNINSUREDas in expansion

timating DDD models with the differences coming from time, state

states (where MEDICAIDst = 1). We consider 𝛾2 to represent unob-

Medicaid expansion decisions, and pre-ACA local area uninsured

served confounders rather than capturing part of the expansion’s

COURTEMANCHE et al.
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causal effect, since the Medicaid expansion should not causally

subsample of interest, we recompute the pret reatment uninsured

affect coverage in an area with a 0% baseline uninsured rate. The

rate using only individuals within that particular subsample. 4

effect of the “fully implemented” ACA, that is, in Medicaid expansion states, combines the impacts of the Medicaid and non-
Medicaid components: 𝛾1 × UNINSUREDas + 𝛾3 × UNINSUREDas. In

4 | R E S U LT S

our results, we report the predicted effect of the ACA at the sample mean pretreatment uninsured rate. Formally, this predicted

Tables 2-4 report the implied effects of the ACA at the average pre-

effect is given by 𝛾1 × UNINSUREDas in nonexpansion states and

ACA uninsured rate based on coefficient estimates from the DDD

𝛾1 × UNINSUREDas + 𝛾3 × UNINSUREDas in expansion states. For each

regression described by equation (1) for each coverage outcome.

TA B L E 2

Implied effects of the ACA at mean pretreatment uninsured rate for full sample and income and race subsamples
Any insurance

Any private

Employer-sponsored

Individually purchased

Medicaid

Other

Panel I: Full sample
Nonelderly adults aged 19-6 4 (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.203, sample size = 10 537 667)
Medicaid
expansion

0.050*** (0.011)

−0.009 (0.009)

0.003 (0.007)

−0.010 (0.012)

0.062*** (0.008)

0.001 (0.001)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.087*** (0.005)

0.028*** (0.006)

0.017*** (0.004)

0.012*** (0.003)

0.062*** (0.007)

0.001 (0.001)

Panel II: Income subsamples
Under 138% FPL (Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.395, sample size = 1 949 375)
Medicaid
expansion

0.170*** (0.033)

−0.031 (0.018)

−0.007 (0.016)

−0.024 (0.019)

0.216*** (0.036)

−0.003 (0.003)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.169*** (0.029)

0.018 (0.011)

0.015 (0.009)

0.002 (0.007)

0.154*** (0.031)

0.002 (0.002)

138%-4 00% FPL (Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.237, sample size = 4 137 149)
Medicaid
expansion

0.056*** (0.016)

0.011 (0.015)

0.023 (0.016)

−0.008 (0.016)

0.047** (0.015)

0.001 (0.002)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.105*** (0.013)

0.066*** (0.014)

0.050*** (0.011)

0.019*** (0.006)

0.042** (0.013)

−0.001 (0.001)

Over 400% FPL (Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.067, sample size = 4 482 022)
Medicaid
expansion

0.012** (0.004)

0.002 (0.006)

0.006 (0.009)

−0.002 (0.007)

0.010* (0.004)

−0.001 (0.002)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.028*** (0.003)

0.019*** (0.005)

0.008 (0.005)

0.010*** (0.003)

0.010* (0.004)

0.001 (0.002)

Panel III: Race/Ethnicity subsamples
Non-Hispanic white (Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.144, sample size = 7 149 482)
Medicaid
expansion

0.051*** (0.006)

−0.002 (0.006)

0.004 (0.008)

−0.004 (0.007)

0.058*** (0.008)

−0.002 (0.001)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.077*** (0.005)

0.019*** (0.005)

0.010** (0.004)

0.007* (0.003)

0.067*** (0.007)

−0.003*** (0.001)

Non-white (Pretreatment Uninsured Rate = 0.306, sample size = 3 388 185)
Medicaid
expansion

0.070*** (0.020)

−0.014 (0.019)

0.005 (0.009)

−0.015 (0.020)

0.083*** (0.013)

0.006* (0.002)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.115*** (0.009)

0.039*** (0.009)

0.025** (0.008)

0.018** (0.006)

0.075*** (0.012)

0.004* (0.002)

Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated at the mean pretreatment uninsured rate. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level, **
at 1% level, and * at 5% level. Sampling weights are used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.
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Implied effects of the ACA at mean pretreatment uninsured rate for marital status and age subsamples
Any insurance

Any private

Employer-sponsored

Individually purchased

Medicaid

Other

Panel I: Marital status subsamples
Married (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.141, sample size = 5 978 285)
Medicaid
expansion

0.032*** (0.008)

−0.005 (0.006)

0.0010 (0.004)

−0.006 (0.008)

0.038*** (0.005)

0.001 (0.001)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.060*** (0.003)

0.022*** (0.003)

0.010*** (0.003)

0.012*** (0.002)

0.040*** (0.003)

0.001 (0.001)

Unmarried (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.272, sample size = 4 559 382)
Medicaid
expansion

0.080*** (0.013)

−0.010 (0.013)

0.005 (0.011)

−0.012 (0.015)

0.093*** (0.013)

0.001 (0.002)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.120*** (0.009)

0.035*** (0.009)

0.025*** (0.006)

0.011* (0.004)

0.089*** (0.011)

0.001 (0.001)

Panel II: Age subsamples
Ages 19-26 (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.270, sample size = 1 562 121)
Medicaid
expansion

0.077*** (0.015)

−0.008 (0.014)

0.006 (0.011)

−0.011 (0.012)

0.090*** (0.013)

0.001 (0.002)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.124*** (0.009)

0.031** (0.009)

0.024** (0.008)

0.009* (0.004)

0.097*** (0.012)

0.003* (0.001)

Ages 27-3 4 (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.256, sample size = 1 667 573)
Medicaid
expansion

0.054*** (0.012)

−0.012 (0.011)

0.006 (0.008)

−0.004 (0.009)

0.070*** (0.013)

0.001 (0.003)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.093*** (0.009)

0.020* (0.008)

0.010 (0.006)

0.010* (0.004)

0.076*** (0.009)

0.002 (0.003)

Ages 35-49 (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.201, sample size = 3 330 941)
Medicaid
expansion

0.035*** (0.010)

−0.012 (0.009)

−0.002 (0.006)

−0.008 (0.010)

0.046*** (0.008)

0.002 (0.002)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.073*** (0.005)

0.026*** (0.005)

0.017*** (0.004)

0.010*** (0.003)

0.048*** (0.006)

0.001 (0.001)

Ages 50-6 4 (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.145, sample size = 3 977 032)
Medicaid
expansion

0.036*** (0.007)

−0.005 (0.005)

0.008 (0.008)

−0.010 (0.012)

0.044*** (0.005)

−0.002 (0.002)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.070*** (0.004)

0.030*** (0.004)

0.015*** (0.003)

0.016*** (0.003)

0.044*** (0.003)

−0.002 (0.002)

Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated at the mean pretreatment uninsured rate. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level, **
at 1% level, and * at 5% level. Sampling weights are used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.

The top panel of Table 2 gives the implied effects that come from

that focused on the Medicaid expansion and not the national com-

our full nonelderly adult sample, while the subsequent panels strat-

ponents of the ACA.

ify the sample in different ways. The first row in each panel shows

The first column of the top panel of Table 2 suggests that at the

the pre-ACA uninsured rate, which we use to calculate the pre-ACA

average pre-ACA uninsured rate, the Medicaid expansion increased

disparities in coverage. Indicators of statistical significance are given

the proportion of residents with insurance coverage by 5 percentage

at the 0.1%, 1%, and 5% levels. For each regression, we separately

points over the three-year period of 2014-2016. In comparison, the

report: (a) the implied effects of the Medicaid expansion alone, and

fully implemented ACA led to an 8.7 percentage point increase in

(b) the fully implemented ACA, which includes the Medicaid ex-

coverage, implying that the package of nationwide reforms contrib-

pansion as well as the individual mandate, subsidized Marketplace

uted the remaining 3.7 percentage points. The remaining columns

coverage, etc. This allows for easier comparison to previous work

examine sources of coverage, where we consider any source of
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Implied effects of the ACA at mean pretreatment uninsured rate for gender and rural/urban subsamples
Any insurance

Any private

Employer-sponsored

Individually purchased

Medicaid

Other

Panel I: Gender subsamples
Women (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.186, sample size = 5 473 836)
Medicaid
expansion

0.064*** (0.011)

−0.006 (0.009)

0.007 (0.010)

−0.011 (0.010)

0.071*** (0.013)

0.002 (0.001)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.096*** (0.008)

0.030*** (0.007)

0.023*** (0.006)

0.008* (0.004)

0.067*** (0.011)

0.002 (0.001)

Men (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.223, sample size = 5 094 710)
Medicaid
expansion

0.057*** (0.011)

−0.003 (0.010)

0.010 (0.011)

−0.008 (0.015)

0.067*** (0.012)

−0.003 (0.002)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.097*** (0.008)

0.040*** (0.010)

0.028*** (0.005)

0.017*** (0.015)

0.063*** (0.010)

−0.001 (0.002)

Panel II: Rural vs urban subsamples
Rural (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.212, sample size = 1 964 610)
Medicaid
expansion

0.081*** (0.016)

−0.015 (0.013)

−0.012 (0.008)

−0.004 (0.012)

0.098*** (0.020)

0.001 (0.004)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.120*** (0.014)

0.018 (0.011)

0.014** (0.005)

−0.004 (0.010)

0.110*** (0.017)

−0.004 (0.003)

Urban (pretreatment uninsured rate = 0.203, sample size = 8 603 936)
Medicaid
expansion

0.056*** (0.011)

−0.004 (0.009)

0.011 (0.011)

−0.010 (0.013)

0.064*** (0.011)

−0.001 (0.002)

Full ACA
(w/
Medicaid)

0.091*** (0.008)

0.036*** (0.008)

0.026*** (0.006)

0.013*** (0.004)

0.058*** (0.010)

0.001 (0.001)

Notes: Results are effects of the ACA on the proportion of residents with the specified type of insurance, evaluated at the mean pretreatment uninsured rate. Standard errors, heteroskedasticity-robust and clustered by state, are in parentheses. *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1% level, **
at 1% level, and * at 5% level. Sampling weights are used. All regressions include area and time fixed effects and the full set of controls.

private coverage, any employer-sponsored (ESI) plan, any individu-

between 100% and 138% of the FPL were eligible for subsidized

ally purchased plan, Medicaid, and any other coverage source. Our

Marketplace coverage with sliding scale premiums in states that

results suggest that in an area with the mean pre-ACA uninsured

did not expand Medicaid. The middle-income group was made el-

rate, the fully implemented ACA is predicted to increase private cov-

igible for subsidized Marketplace coverage with sliding scale pre-

erage by 2.8 percentage points. This is driven by increases in both

miums in all states. The highest income group was also able to

ESI (1.7 percentage points) and individually purchased coverage (1.2

purchase Marketplace coverage in all states, but was not eligible

percentage points). The full ACA increased Medicaid coverage by

for a subsidy. In 2013, the uninsured rate for those in the highest

6.2%, all of which comes from the Medicaid expansion component of

income group was 6.7%, while it was 39.5% for the lowest income

the law. The effects of the Medicaid expansion on having any private

group.

coverage, ESI, and individually purchased insurance reported are all
statistically insignificant.

According to the first column of Table 2, this 32.8 percentage
point coverage gap was reduced by 15.8 percentage points (= 17

The other two panels of Table 2 stratify the sample into sub-

percentage point reduction for the lowest income group—1.2 per-

samples separately by income and race. Since each subsample

centage point reduction for the highest income group) by the

must contain enough 2013 respondents to accurately compute

Medicaid expansion. This represents a 48% reduction in the low-

uninsured rates at the local area level, we are constrained to a

income coverage gap. The fully implemented ACA, which includes

maximum of two or three subsamples per stratification in order

the Medicaid expansion, but also influences the coverage of higher

to obtain meaningfully precise estimates. For income, we consider

income individuals through the national components of the ACA, re-

three groups: those with income under 138% of the FPL, those

duced the low-income coverage gap by 43%.

between 138% and 400%, and those above 400%. The lowest

Turning to sources of coverage in the remaining columns, sev-

income group was made eligible for Medicaid in states that ex-

eral results emerge. First, the gain in coverage among low-income

panded their Medicaid programs via the ACA. Additionally, those

individuals occurred completely via Medicaid coverage in Medicaid
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expansion states. Moreover, some of the coverage expansion among

of insurance coverage was about 1 percentage point. The fully im-

middle-and high-
income individuals occurred via Medicaid cov-

plemented ACA reduced this disparity by 2.9 percentage points, 2.5

erage even though these income ranges were not eligible for the

percentage points of which comes from the Medicaid expansion.

expansion.

Tables 2-4 only report impacts of the ACA at the relevant mean

We next examine the race stratification in the third panel of

pretreatment uninsured rate, which is 20.3% for the full sample and

Table 2. The racial coverage gap in 2013 was 16.2 percentage

varies for each subsample of interest. This approach masks consider-

points, with nonwhites having an uninsured rate of 30.6%, as com-

able heterogeneity in the law’s effects since local area pretreatment

pared to 14.4% for non-Hispanic whites. Our results suggest that

uninsured rates varied widely, ranging from 3% to 53% with a stan-

the Medicaid expansion reduced the 16.2 percentage point cover-

dard deviation of 7% for the full sample. Figure S1 therefore shows

age gap by 1.9 percentage points (12%), while the fully implemented

how the predicted changes in coverage vary across this range of un-

ACA reduced the gap by 3.8 percentage points (23%). The results for

insured rates in both expansion states (as indicated by “Full ACA”)

source of coverage show that the larger gains for nonwhites occur

and nonexpansion states (as indicated by “ACA Without Medicaid

across the board, as the effects of the full ACA on all types of cover-

Expansion”). The top left graph shows that the predicted impact of

age are larger for them than for whites.

the full ACA on the probability of having any coverage reached as

The top panel of Table 3 examines disparities of coverage by

high as 22.6 percentage points at the highest sample pretreatment

marital status. In 2013, unmarried individuals had a 27.2% uninsured

uninsured rate (53%). In contrast, without the Medicaid expansion

rate, while married individuals had a 14.1% uninsured rate. This un-

the maximum effect was only 9.5 percentage points. The “Medicaid

married coverage gap was reduced by 4.8 percentage points (37 %)

coverage” graph predicts increases in Medicaid coverage that reach

by the Medicaid expansion, while the fully implemented ACA re-

as high as 16.1 and 0.1 percentage points in expansion and nonex-

duced this coverage gap by 6 percentage points (46%). The shrinking

pansion states, respectively.

gap is attributable to larger gains in employer-provided and Medicaid
coverage among unmarried individuals.

Similarly, Tables S2-S4 display the impact of the Medicaid expansion and the fully implemented ACA for the mean of the lower and

The bottom panel of Table 3 splits the sample into four age-

higher portion of the uninsured rates for all subsamples. These re-

groups: 19-
26 years of age, 27-
34 years of age, 35-
49 years of

sults suggest that for practically every type of coverage, the larger

age, and 50-6 4 years of age. The rationale for separating 19-to

the proportion of the subsample uninsured in 2013, the larger the

26-year-olds from 27-to 34-year-olds is that the former was pre-

gain in coverage. For example, among individuals with income below

viously affected by the earliest major ACA coverage expansion to

138% of the FPL, the mean pretreatment uninsured rate for the

take effect, the 2010 dependent coverage mandate. Depending

upper half of their uninsured rate distribution is 46.3% and the mean

on the mandate’s effectiveness, it is possible that the effect of the

for the lower half of the distribution is 33%. Table S2 reports that the

2014 ACA provisions that we study could be weaker among 19-to

fully implemented ACA is predicted to increase coverage by 20 per-

26-than 27-to 34-year-olds. That said, the results show that those

centage points at the mean of the upper half of the uninsured rate

aged 19-26 years still had the highest uninsured rate (27.0%) among

distribution of this group, while predicted to increase coverage by 14

the age-groups in 2013, three years after the dependent coverage

percentage points at the mean of the lower half of the distribution.

mandate took effect. Those aged 50-6 4 had the lowest uninsured
rate of 14.5%, for a young adult coverage gap of 12.5 percentage
points. The Medicaid expansion reduced this coverage gap by 4.1
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percentage points (33%), and all 2014 ACA provisions together
reduced it by 5.4 percentage points (43%). The larger gain among

The primary components of the ACA were designed to reduce in-

19-to 26-year-olds is driven by a much larger increase in Medicaid

surance coverage disparities by moving the U.S. closer to universal

coverage (9.7 percentage points for the full ACA compared to 4.4

coverage. This paper is the first to use three years of post-ACA im-

percentage points among 50-to 64-year-olds).

plementation data (2014-2016) to estimate the impact of the law

The top panel of Table 4 stratifies sample by gender. We did not

on disparities across different categories of coverage along several

observe as large an initial coverage gap by gender (22.3% uninsured

dimensions, including income, race, marital status, age, gender, and

rate for males vs. 18.6% for females). The results suggest that the

residence in rural vs. urban locations. We find that the ACA reduced

Medicaid expansion actually increased the size of this coverage gap

the coverage disparity by income by 43% and that this was entirely

by 19% since it reduced the uninsured rate for females by a greater

driven by the Medicaid expansion that was specifically targeted

degree than it did for males. Conversely, the fully implemented ACA

at low-income childless adults. Conversely, we find that both the

reduced the size of the gender coverage gap by 3%.

Medicaid expansion and nationwide provisions of the ACA con-

The bottom panel of Table 4 stratifies our sample by urban vs.

tributed to the 23%, 46%, and 36% reductions in coverage dispari-

rural location. Rural individuals are generally considered a vulnera-

ties by race, marital status, and age, respectively. The ACA did not

ble population when it comes to health care access. The uninsured

meaningfully influence the coverage gap by gender, while it closed

rate in 2013 was 21.2% for rural nonelderly adults as compared to

and actually reversed the small rural coverage gap. Ultimately, we

20.3% for urban nonelderly adults, so the initial disparity in terms

conclude that the ACA substantially reduced coverage disparities
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along several important dimensions, but that sizeable disparities still

featured a combination of insurance market regulations, individual

remain across income, race, marital status, and age-groups.

and employer mandates, subsidies, and health insurance exchanges

The fact that the ACA’s impacts on disparities cannot be fully

that served as the model for the ACA—had only small effects on

attributed to the Medicaid expansion along most dimensions illus-

marriage and divorce rates. 24 In Table S8, we estimate our baseline

trates the importance of implementing econometric techniques that

regression model separately with indicators of being married, of

capture other aspects of the law. The DDD models we report on

being newly married during the past 12 months, of being newly

this paper are causally interpretable based on the identifying as-

divorced during the past 12 months, and of being newly married or

sumptions that, conditional on the controls, if the ACA had not oc-

divorced in the past 12 months as dependent variables. The results

curred: (a) changes in coverage in the postreform period would not

suggest that there was no statistically significant effect of our ACA

have been correlated with prereform uninsured rates, and (b) any

treatment variables on these outcomes. In addition, we replicate

differential changes in coverage in the postreform period between

our main analyses after dropping individuals from the sample that

expansion and nonexpansion states would not have been correlated

had any change in their marital status in the last 12 months. The

with prereform uninsured rates.

results, reported in Table S9, are very similar to the results pre-

One limitation of our work is that we cannot test these identi-

sented previously. While the available evidence therefore suggests

fying assumptions directly. However, we can test them indirectly

that our assumption of exogenous stratification is plausible, it is of

with an event study model that interacts the treatment variables

course not possible to establish this definitively.

with the full set of year fixed effects. This allows us to trace out the

With those limitations in mind, our results are broadly con-

effects of the treatment variables over time, relative to a base year

sistent with those reported in the Medicaid expansion literature9

of 2013. We would expect around 5% of the coefficient estimates

in that both the Medicaid expansion and the fully implemented

of interest in the pret reatment years 2011 and 2012 to be statis-

ACA generally reduce but do not eliminate coverage disparities.

tically significant at the 5% level merely by chance. Substantially

These results imply that full repeal of the ACA would exacerbate

more significant findings for these “placebo tests” could indicate

these disparities. Additionally, it is possible that changes to the

a problem with the identifying assumption. In Tables S5-S7, we

ACA after 2016, including regulatory changes, such as Medicaid

present the results from the event study models for the full sample

work requirements, and the elimination of the individual mandate,

and all subsamples. Across the three tables, the interactions of the

would lead to further changes in disparities. For example, our find-

treatment variables with 2011 and 2012 are significant 14% of the

ing that the Medicaid expansion eliminated 43% of the coverage

time (55 out of 384), which is somewhat greater than the expected

gap across income groups is likely to change if Medicaid work re-

5%. However, for many subsamples the model performs quite

quirements, that would be expected to potentially reduce enroll-

well. Nearly half of the placebo test failures (23 out of the 55) are

ment, 25 are widely implemented. Thus, more work is needed to

concentrated among the coefficients on UNINSUREDas × POSTt for

examine the impact of the ACA as economic conditions change

the age subsamples. Our main results for the effects of the non-

and the ACA itself changes.

Medicaid expansion components of the ACA among the age subsamples should therefore be interpreted with the most caution.
Another limitation is that our disparity analyses assume that the

AC K N OW L E D G M E N T S

subsamples are exogenously determined. Income is one source of
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